Introduction
Web services are loosely coupled applications that use XML based technology for representation and communication across the Internet. Since Web services technology is emerging as main pillar of service-oriented architectures (SOA) [1] , services need richer description models due to the loose coupling property of SOA. Consequently, all the information about the service and needed by the client should be included in service description in order to allow the client to interact correctly with it. The business protocol of the Web service that is the possible message exchange sequences supported by the service should be included in the service descriptions such as proposed in [2] .
This work discusses the results of modeling and analyzing Web service business protocols augmented with time constraints and access control policies. Access control policies are expressed using ontology in order to benefit from the flexibility offered by subsumption on concepts together with the possibility to use ontology alignment in the context of the semantic Web. We define and verify Web service compatibility in order to see if (and how) two services can have interactions based on their protocols. We 1 This work is partially founded by the European FP7 project COMPAS, GAN 215175, http://www.compas-ict.eu/. also define and verify a notion of replaceability to see if a service can be replaced transparently by another one for its current requesters between business protocols after adding access control policy to their descriptions. Therefore, our main contribution is to model and analyze Web services after assigning the ACP in the business protocols.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related work. Section 3 presents an informal scenario and the proposed architecture. Section 4 describes the formal methods, algorithms, and implementation of Web service business protocols. Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusion.
Related work
In this work we bring together two main research topics, compatibility and replaceability formalization and analysis with time aspects and Web service access control. Therefore, we will first detail the previous work in Web service formalization and Web service business protocols. Secondly, the previous work of compatibility and replaceability analysis is detailed. Finally, the Web service access control and its enforcement models are presented.
Web service formalization and Web service business protocols
The need for formal methods and software tools for automatically analyzing service descriptions is widely recognized, and many approaches have been developed to this end. Activity-based models, rule-based models, and state-based models are three common model families. Because state-based model is commonly used to model the behaviours of systems, due to the fact that it is simple and intuitive, we choose it in our model. Activity-based models are more suitable for creating executable models and rulebased models are a natural fit for complex decision-making systems. They are however less suitable for describing behaviours. Timed automata [4] are well known formalisms for real-time systems and there are some well known tools supporting them as UPPAAL [5] . Therefore, it can be used for describing and analyzing the behavior of Web services, specifically those including time restrictions.
Various Web services models have been proposed for capturing different types of abstractions. For instance, Dirk et al. in [6] define protocol interface formalism for services which is similar to the timed model proposed by Daniela et al. in [7] but without time aspects. Tevfik et al. in [8] present a modelling for Web services interactions and present further discussion in [9] . They present formalism for specification and verification of electronic services for composition purposes. Zongyan et al. in [10] propose a language for Web services choreographies called Chor as a simplification of WS-CDL [11] (the reference specification for choreographies). BPEL also offers abstract process for describing the externally observable behaviour of a service composition. Michele et al. in [12] have done some work on the formalization of muli-party protocols with temporal constraints for service networks. Some work consider timing abstractions have been done by Raman et al. in [13] which mainly reuses well-known timed automata modelchecking techniques in service-based compositions.
Compatibility and replaceability
Formal analysis of service protocols in terms of automated support to service interoperability at the business protocol level has been discussed in some recent works [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21] . A model for business protocols and a framework for protocol-based analysis had been presented by Benatallah et al. [22, 23, 14, 24] . This model captures all the conversations that are supported by a service. According to their definitions, a protocol P1 is fully compatible with a protocol P2, if all the executions of P1 can interoperate with P2 and if only some of the executions of P1 can interoperate with P2, then P1 is said to be partially compatible with P2. The drawback of full compatibility is that one of the two protocols (e.g., P1) accepts all the execution of the other protocol (e.g., P2) but protocol P2 may not accept all the executions of protocol P1 and this produces errors during the interaction. For timed services modeling, they converted the timed business protocol to timed automata [15] and defined set of operators like (composition, intersection, and projection) for checking the compatibility and replaceability. Therefore, we reworked this previous work based on our new definitions of compatibility and replaceability which are based on the error free interaction.
Bordeaux et al. in [16] present three different definitions for compatibility: (a) two services A and B are compatible if they have opposite behaviors; (b) two Web services are compatible if they do not have unspecified reception, and (c) two services are compatible if there is at least one execution leading to a pair of final states. There is a drawback with the first and the second definitions, that is they do not check whether the interaction will reach a final state or not. In our definitions of compatibility, we merge the second and the third definition. Therefore, two business protocols are compatible if and only if any potential sent message from one service can be received by the other service during their interaction and vice versa, and any reachable state is not in a deadlock, i.e., there is at least one execution leading to a pair of final states. Based on our definition, if two protocols are compatible, we guarantee that no error can happen during the interaction.
Web services access control
Development of suitable access control models, able to restrict access to Web services to authorized users is an important issue. Security technologies commonly adopted for Web sites and traditional access control models are not satisfactory [25] . Currently, there are two research directions in access control. One has focused on efforts to develop new access control models to meet the policy needs of real world application domains. These have led to several successful models such as the NIST Standard RBAC model [26] , WS-AC1 [25] , and conversation-based Web services access control model by Mecella et al. [30] . In a parallel, researchers have developed policy languages for access control. These include XACML [27] , WS-Policy [28] and finally to Semantic Web based languages such as Rei [29] and KAoS [34] .
There is a lot of research for presenting access control models for Web services composition [31, 35] . For instance, Cheikh et al. in [31] present automatic Web services composition in trust-aware communities. Paci et al. in [32] present an approach to determine at the design time whether a chorography can be implemented by a set of services based on their access control policies and the disclosed policies regulating the release of their credentials. They use the idea of assigning ACP on business protocol but not for checking the compatibility. In our paper, we assign the access control policy on the business protocol of the Web service but for the purpose of checking compatibility and replaceability.
Because our work is based on Web service conversation model, there is a relation between this work and the work which is done by Mecella et al. in [30] . Both of us present the service access control as a state transition system but they do not consider the business protocol of the consumer. They only consider consumer credentials. There are some situations where the credentials of the consumer satisfy the AC but based on the business protocols, there is no complete conversation can be done. Therefore, there is a need for preliminary step for checking the compatibility and considering the AC. This step can be integrated with the standard AC model and the model which is presented in [30] .
To the best of our knowledge, in most of access control enforcement models, checking of the compatibility and replaceability after assigning ACP is not included. We will try to merge all the previous research issues by including the compatibility and replaceability checking box in the enforcement model and taking time into account. This step can help basically in two scenarios:
x The consumer will invoke the service which is compatible with him in terms of message exchange, time, and access control, (i.e. based on the set of credentials with the consumer he can access the service which accept his credentials). x With respect to replaceability, service can replace another service with the guarantee that it has the same access control and it is compatible with all the services which are compatible with the replaced service. We will use the ontology in presenting the ACP and credentials. There are two main advantages of using ontology in policy specification and management [33] :
1. Ease policy specification and management by sharing policies for common attributes, composing and overriding policies. 2. Protect sensitive information by avoiding information leaking request and answering unnecessary request. Description logics (DLs) [3] as policy formalisms technique can be used to present access control policy ontology. Descriptions logics are very useful for defining, integrating, and maintaining ontology, which provide the semantic Web with a common understanding of the basic semantic concepts used to annotate Web pages. Access control policy will be formalized using the DL. The access control policies are presented as concepts describe set of credentials as individuals. We will perform subsumption (⊆), union(∪), and intersection(∩) operations on the ontology during our algorithms. Presenting ACP of Web services as ontology will enables us to use ontology alignment tools to find classes of data that are "semantically equivalent ". We can use the ontology of the service provider and the ontology of the consumer and produce new global ontology. This new ontology can be used on our analysis in checking the compatibility between Web service and the consumer.
Informal scenario and architecture
Checking compatibility and replaceability between two Web services after assigning the access control policy is important in many scenarios. For instance, the scenario which can be happened for consumer searching for a Web service:
1-Consumer searches the registry of services (e.g. UDDI) and fined the service with required operations. 2-Consumer sends his protocol to the service provider to check compatibility. 3-Service provider performs the checking and returns the result to the client. 4-If the result is compatible, the consumer will start to invoke the service. 5-During the interaction: The service asks for some credentials to access its operation and if the consumer has not these credentials, the interaction is terminated and the consumer starts again from step 1 using another service. This is continues until the consumer gets the service which accepts his credentials. To solve the problem in this scenario in step 5, service provider shows at the beginning the access controls for the service operations by two approaches. In the first approach, a description of the policies for each operation is presented independently on each others. But this approach is not useful in the situation where service consists of more than one operation and these operations are dependent on each others. Therefore, second approach proposes to present the ACP as state transition model indicating the relation between these set of ACP, as the model presented by Mecella in [30] . But this approach is enforced without considering the business protocol of the consumer. They only consider consumer credentials. There are some situations where the credentials of the consumer satisfy the AC but based on the business protocols there is no conversation can be completed. Therefore, there is a need for preliminary step for checking the compatibility and considering the AC. This step can be integrated with the standard AC model and the model which is presented by Mecella in [30] . Also replaceability analysis is important in a situation which needs satisfaction between the two protocols in terms of access control model. For instance:
x Service provider wants to replace his old service with a new one which supports the same conversations with the same ACP (i.e. the new service has more functionality than the old one but all the functionalities of the old one must be included in the new one). x Consumer wants to replace Web service at which he interacts with a new one supports the same conversations with the same ACP (i.e. the new service has more quality of service). As a result, a new definition of the compatibility taking into account the access control policy is needed to guarantee the access of the required resources with the provided credential during the analysis phase. Therefore, we merged the time business protocol with ACP model in checking the compatibility and replaceability analysis.
The proposed architecture is shown in figure 1 . This access control enforcement system (ACES) model is composed of Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Policy Administration Point (PAP) which make it compliant with the XACML standard. The PEP realizes the interface with clients and with the checker unit. The checker has a set of tools for checking the compatibility and replaceability analysis using business protocols augmented with the access control policies and before the invocation of the service. It can also be used to keep track of the state of the conversation between the consumer and the service during the interaction (i.e. after invoking of the service). Further, it uses the ACP ontology in calculating the subsumption during the checking process. The PEP intercepts all the access requests submitted by clients to access an operation that uses policy-based access management, the PEP will describe the user's attributes to other entities on the system. The Policy Decision Point (PDP) has the job of deciding whether or not to authorize the user based on the description of the user's attributes provided by PEP. Policy Administration Point (PAP) can provide many enterprise SOA policy administration capabilities but the end result of the policy administration point is to store or distribute policy updates. As shown from the architecture, our contribution is mainly the checking unit which can be used with many access control enforcement system (ACES) model. The addition of this model to any access control enforcement system does not require a big modification of these existing models and can be integrated easily to them. 
Formalization and Algorithms
This section presents the formal definitions of timed business protocol and the algorithms used in the automated analysis. The timed business protocol definition is based on the definition of Benatallah in [2] , augmented with ACP. The timed business protocol is represented as a state chart which consists of a set of states containing an initial state and one of more of final states and set of transitions. States represent the various stages that a service may go through while transitions can be implicit transition (i.e. an internal transition of the service from one state to another without sending or receiving messages) or explicit transition which are triggered when a message is received or sent. The implicit transitions are assigned with time constraints and the explicit transition is assigned with message specifications and the ACP. This protocol is deterministic (i.e. all the outputs transition from any state are different) and does not contain any cycle constituted with only implicit transitions. In order to ease the analysis of such protocols, we perform the conversion of implicit transitions to time constraints on explicit transitions. The new business protocol is called "Explicitly Timed Business Protocol assigned with ACP". The conversion algorithm is consists of two main steps:
1. Updating all the explicit transitions which share with an implicit transition the same source state by adding time constraints reflects the effect of the implicit transitions. 2. Update the time constraints on the explicit transitions which have a preceding implicit transitions or implicit path (i.e. there is an implicit transition or path before the source state of an explicit transition). Complexity analysis: Let n be the number of states and the numbers of the implicit transitions and explicit transition are L e and L i respectively. Therefore, the conversion algorithm runs in time O(L e x L i ).
Definition 1:
An explicitly time business protocol assigned with ACP is a tuple Pr = (S; s 0 ; T; F) which consists of the following elements: -S is a finite set of states and s 0 ∈ S , is the initial state.
, is a finite set of explicit transition, where M is a set of messages assigned to the explicit transitions between the states, P is the set of access control policies, c is the set of credentials. I is the set of time intervals in the form I[x; y[ where x; y ∈ ℝ + . -This protocol is deterministic (i.e. all the outputs transition from any state are different) and does not contain any cycle constituted with only implicit transitions.
-All states in the automata are accessible and co-accessible.
-F ⊆ S is a set of final states. If F = {∅} then Pr is said to be an empty protocol. output(s i ) defines all the outgoing transitions triggered from the state (s i ) and input(s i ) defines all the incoming transitions to the state (s i ).
Compatibility
There is a difference in the methodology between checking the compatibility in terms of message exchange and in terms of ACP. Checking the compatibility in terms of message exchange depends on the current message of each protocol and corresponding current message in the other protocol. But checking the compatibility in terms of ACP depends on the current ACP and the previous or current credentials of the corresponding transition. Therefore, there is a need to update each transition with all the credentials that can be provided before reaching it (i.e. transition credentials updated to be all the credential resulted from the current credentials and the previous provided credentials). We called this set of credentials"cumulative Access Control Credentials (ACC)". Figure 2 shows an example of two business protocols P1 and P2 where P1 provide its C credential in the first transition but P2 asked for it in the third transition. If we compare the two protocols without calculating the cumulative ACC then we will find that they are incompatible but after calculating the ACC for P1 we find that they are compatible. The question is then; in which step in the checking process the satisfaction between ACP and credential can be checked? Figure 3 shows an example to answer this question. In this figure, P1 is a client protocol and P2 is a service protocol and P1 is compatible with P2. P3 is another service protocol which is not compatible with P1 because the policy xz in M7 in P3 can not satisfied by (zx or yz) credentials in P1. Figure 4 shows an example where protocol P2 has a policy zx not satisfied by (zx or yz) credentials in P1 but the two protocols are compatible because there is a part of the credentials (yz) will not provided by the protocol P1 if it interacts with P2 and the provided credentials in M7 is zx which satisfy the zx in P2. Therefore, we must not calculate the cumulative before determining the transition which will be used in the interaction between the two protocols. So, when we update ,s n+1 2 )) , in the product automata, each policy p i 1 is satisfied by the set of cumulative credentials C i 2 and p i 2 is satisfied by the set of cumulative credentials C i 1 .
The algorithm which is used for checking the compatibility between two protocols in terms of product automata with ACP can be divided into two parts. The first part is for checking compatibility in terms of message exchange and this can be done by constructing the product automata and traversing through it, starting by the initial state, using breadth first approach and checking that if there is a state not included in this relation set R (i.e. each state have two corresponding states of the two protocol and all the outgoing messages from this state in one protocol can be received by the another protocol) then the algorithm stops and the two protocols are not compatible, else if all states in the product automata are included in this relation set then the two protocols are compatible in terms of message exchange and go to the second part. The second part is for calculating the cumulative credentials on each transition on the product automata.
Algorithm 1 presents the second part of the algorithm. The idea of this algorithm is to use the queue data structure to cumulate the credentials. Each element of the queue consists of the state, cumulative credentials corresponding the protocol P1 in this state, and the cumulative credential corresponding the protocol P2 in this state. The algorithm traverses through the automata for updating these credentials of the states and in the same time updates the cumulative credentials on the transitions. After calculating the cumulative credentials on each transition, if any ACP related to one of the two protocols on any transitions is not satisfied by the cumulative credentials on this transition related to the other transition then the two protocols are not compatible in terms of ACP. Example: In this example, a business protocol of a web service performing two operations with two different ACP and a client service that interacts with this service are presented in figures 5 and 6 respectively. Figure 7 and 8 show the product automata of the two protocols and the graphical representation of the used ontology. Note that the compatibility of the two protocols partially depends on the subsumption relation between school and student cards. Using the ontology, the two protocols are compatible because the School student card is a student card. Complexity analysis: Let T1 and T2 be the number of transitions of the two protocols P1 and P2 respectively, the construction of the product automata will take (T1 x T2). The calculation of the cumulative credentials will take number of states in the product automata (S1 x S2) multiplied by the size of the longest non looping path 
Else
The two protocols are not compatible in terms of ACP.
multiplied by (S1 x S2) (i.e. cumulative credentials takes (S1 x S2) 3 ) . As a result, the complexity for the algorithm will be ((T1 x T1) + (S1 x S2)
3 ).
Replaceability
In our work we are interested in two types of replaceability analysis: full replaceability and replaceability in terms of interaction with specific consumer. Protocol P ሱ⎯⎯⎯⎯ሮ (s n+1 1 ,s n+1 2 )), in the intersection automata, any set of credential satisfy the cumulative policy P i 2 can also satisfy the cumulative policy P i 1 and c i 1 ⊆ C i 2 .
The algorithm for checking the replaceability uses the same mechanism which is used in the compatibility algorithm. The idea is to traverse through the intersection automata starting from the initial state and checking the mentioned properties of the relation R. The second part uses the same technique as algorithm 1 but instead of calculating the cumulative credentials it calculates the cumulative policies for the first protocol P 1 and the cumulative credentials for the second protocol P 2 . For all policies in the intersection automata, any set of credential satisfy P i 2 can also satisfy the cumulative policy P i 1 and the set of credentials c i 1 is a subset of the set of cumulative credentials C i 2 . The complexity of this algorithm is the same as the complexity of the compatibility algorithm in the previous section as they only differ in the way they compare transitions.
Implementation
We have implemented all of the previous set of algorithms and it will be part of the COMPAS project (Compliance-driven models, languages, and architectures for services). The software is consists of a graphical user interface editor for business protocols with set of compatibility and replaceability checking tools. The protocols are designed as a timed automata assigned with access control policy which is presented as ontology.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigated a high-level analysis and management of business protocols of Web services that is aware of access control policies assigned to service operations. Beside protocol annotation with policies and credentials, we defined notions of compatibility and replaceability based on those annotated protocols. Together with those notions, we proposed algorithms for checking compatibility between two services and for checking whether one service can transparently replace another from the point of view of compatibility.
The contributions of this paper can be extended in several directions. First, the time constraints considered here could be extended to consider timeouts w.r.t. several previous transitions as in [15] . Another direction for future work consists in abstracting annotations in order to deal with other functional and non functional properties, such as quality of service or privacy. A third possible extension of this work is to automatically build adapters allowing two services to work together even though they are not directly compatible. A fourth extension is to use these tools for web service chorography and composition.
